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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has been marked by political divisions in US public trust of scientists.
Such divisions are well known on other topics, but regarding COVID-19 they arose suddenly,
with disastrous results. Distrust of scientists elsewhere has been variously explained in terms of
belief systems, cognitive factors, peer influences, or elite cues. Three surveys conducted from
March to July 2020 in the state of New Hampshire observed rapid change, providing a test of
explanations in this case. Trust in science agencies such as the CDC fell dramatically among
Republicans, while views among Democrats and Independents changed little; the
Democrat–Republican gap grew from 10 to 64 points. This rapid change coincided with a
reversal of views toward the CDC expressed by President Donald Trump, and amplified by
conservative media. People expressing lower trust in scientists also report less compliance with
science-based behavioral recommendations, and less support for scientifically-informed policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The scattered and frequently ineffective US response to COVID-19, from government policy
down to individual behavior, highlights deep political divisions regarding the relevant science.
Politicized distrust of scientists on this topic is striking not only for its unfortunate consequences,
but also for having arisen suddenly, almost as fast as the virus itself. Some major scientific fields
such as biology and geology have long histories of political controversy, including pressure to
limit discussion of central ideas in textbooks or teaching, and even to exclude them from
measures of science literacy (Bhattacharjee 2010). More recently, climate change became one of
the most politically divisive questions on surveys, correlating so strongly with ideology and party
that climate views behave like an indicator for political identity (Kahan 2015; Hamilton et al.
2020). Even in the case of climate change, however, the transition in public perceptions from
scientific concern to identity indicator took years to accomplish (Brulle et al. 2012; Carmichael et
al. 2017; Gauchat et al. 2017). That transition is notable in part for its top-down origins, as
rejection of scientists’ conclusions about human-caused climate change spread from economic
and political elites through media to the public (Dunlap and McCright 2015).
COVID-19, however, is a word that did not exist until February 2020. Deep political divisions
spun up almost overnight, and seemingly from nowhere, although of course they built upon
elements that were already there. Conspiratorial distrust of medical science has long been a
centerpiece of anti-vaccination sentiments (Goldberg and Richey 2020), which like rejection of
evolution or climate change tend to be more prevalent among conservatives (Berinsky 2012;
Bernat et al. 2009; Hamilton 2015; Hamilton et al. 2015; Lewandowsky et al. 2020; Pew 2009;
Reitera et al. 2011), including 2016 presidential candidate Donald Trump (Youngdahl 2016).
Although vaccination against COVID-19 remained hypothetical during the pandemic’s early
months, medically-advised steps such as wider testing, quarantines, stay-at-home orders and
mask-wearing caused economic and social disruption. To some people who were not
immediately affected by the disease itself, or far from its initial urban centers, these disruptions
seemed needless and perhaps conspiratorial. Pre-COVID disregard for the seriousness of
pandemics in general was also apparent in the Trump administration’s 2018 dismantling of
Obama-era programs for disease security (Sun 2018) and cuts to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) budget (Morris 2020). During the 2016 Zika virus pandemic, surveys
observed political differences in public trust of science agencies such as CDC for information
about the virus, parallel to but milder than differences regarding science agencies such as NASA
for information about climate change (Hamilton and Safford 2020a; Safford et al. 2017, 2020).
Although many precedents foreshadowed distrust of scientists on COVID-19, the speed and
depth of politicization in this new case have been striking. How did it happen? Research on
previous cases of science rejection offers possible explanations that might be grouped into four
broad categories: characteristics of the science itself; individual-level cognitive or behavioral
factors; peer group or cultural influences; and messaging by elites. These categories are not
mutually exclusive; all four could be reinforcing each other on deeply polarized topics such as
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climate change. Regarding COVID-19, our question here is not whether one type of explanation
is uniquely correct, but whether one stands out as the main driver behind a very fast change.
To explore this question, we analyze data from three surveys conducted in spring and summer
2020, which caught change in progress. Each carried an identically-worded item about trusting
science agencies such as CDC for information on the coronavirus. Overall trust dropped from
77% in March to 59% in July—but this was entirely due to a more precipitous decline in one
subgroup. The details of this change point toward an explanation for how attitudes toward
scientists were politicized. Our analysis contributes to a growing literature on what might be
termed “the social bases of COVID concern” (Adolph et al. 2020; Alcott et al. 2020; Brzezinski
et al. 2020; Cassese et al. 2020; Gadarian et al. 2020; Graham et al. 2020; Green et al. 2020;
Grossman et al. 2020; Hill et al. 2020; Merkley and Loewen 2020; Motta et al. 2020; Pennycook
et al. 2020; Shepherd et al. 2020; Sides et al. 2020). The social bases characterize who took the
pandemic most or least seriously, with consequences for everyone.
2. BACKGROUND
Historically, Americans have tended to regard science and scientists more highly than most other
institutions. Concerning science in general, the high regard appears fairly stable and broad-based
(American Academy of Arts and Science 2018; Funk and Kennedy 2020). For example, a recent
Pew Research poll found 73% agreement that science has had a mostly positive effect on society
(Funk 2020). This result fits with 17 previous surveys from 1979 to 2016, all of which found
between 68% and 80% agreement (mostly, in low to mid 70s) on the predominantly positive
effects of scientific research (National Science Board 2018). Within this broad overall agreement,
however, researchers often see somewhat lower confidence in science among conservatives
(Gauchat 2012; Mann and Schleifer 2020; Nadelson et al. 2014).
Ideological or political differences become more pronounced when surveys focus on particular
topics. Scholars have offered many explanations for why certain scientific topics face politicized
resistance. These explanations might be grouped into four broad categories, briefly summarized
below.
[1] Characteristics of the science itself, or of scientists and their communication. For example,
scientific findings might contradict individuals’ worldviews, have ideologically or economically
unpalatable implications, or be presented in ways perceived as off-putting. Some major fields
including biology and geology stand out for having central conclusions that are accepted by
virtually all scientists (e.g., that humans evolved from earlier species, or the Earth is billions of
years old) while being rejected by a large fraction of the public. On these topics, objections are
linked to religious beliefs (Ayala 2008). Another dimension of conflict is identified in Allan
Schnaiberg’s distinction between impact science, which may point out harmful consequences
from economic activities, and production science, intended to enhance economic production
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(Schnaiberg 1977, 1980; McCright et al. 2013). Conservatives are expected to view impact
science skeptically, while being more favorable toward production science.
[2] Individual-level cognitive or behavioral factors, such as information-processing habits, or a
tendency toward conspiratorial thinking. Individuals may selectively acquire and retain
information that reinforces their existing prejudices (biased assimilation: Corner et al. 2012;
Ehret et al. 2017; McCright and Dunlap 2011). Preferences for politically-slanted news sources
are a key mechanism of biased assimilation (Bolin and Hamilton 2018; Feldman et al. 2014;
Krosnick and MacInnis 2010; Slater 2007). People also apply motivated reasoning to reach
predetermined conclusions (Druckman and McGrath 2019; Kraft et al. 2015; Kunda 1990; Taber
and Lodge 2006), or solution aversion to discount the reality of problems that imply a need for
unwanted solutions (Campbell and Kay 2014; Fogg et al. 2020). Propensities toward
conspiratorial thinking are prominent in public discourse on climate change, vaccines and other
topics, making them a focus of recent studies (Hornsey et al. 2018; Lewandowsky et al. 2016;
Uscinski and Olivella 2017; van der Linden et al. 2020). Anti-intellectualism, associated with
opposition to scientific positions on climate change and other topics (Merkley 2020; Motta 2017,
2018), casts expert discourse as objectionable in itself.
[3] Peer group or cultural influences, in which science attitudes are adopted from and reinforced
by one’s peers (cultural cognition: Kahan et al. 2011), or performatively expressed for approval
(Mann and Schleifer 2020).
[4] Messaging by elites, linking rejection of scientific conclusions with sociopolitical identity, so
that attentive individuals learn what views are appropriate for them. In contrast to science content
and individual or social-group explanations, elite cues (and related theories) point toward
external drivers: the role of economic interests or political and media elites informing their
followers about what views they should hold. John Zaller’s (1992) seminal analysis of surveys
examined how exposure to elite discourse forms individual opinions. Adam Berinsky (2009)
observes US public opinion responding to elite cues more than events during World War II and
the Iraq War. Experimental work confirms the prevalence of elite-cue effects (reviewed by
Tappin et al. 2020, with a meta-analysis in Tappin 2020; also see Bakker et al. 2020; Barber and
Pope 2019; Cohen 2003; Kam 2005; Tesler 2018). Elite cues have been prominent regarding
climate change (Brulle et al. 2012; Carmichael and Brulle 2017), overshadowing individual
processes such as motivated reasoning (Merkley and Stecula 2018, 2020). Elite messaging often
serves an agenda, as when corporate polluters build public opposition to formerly popular
environmental protections (Gauchat et al. 2017; Jacques et al. 2008), or fossil-fuel interests derail
mitigation of climate change (Dunlap and McCright 2015).
The four types of explanations sketched above, [1]–[4], are not mutually exclusive but they have
different scope. Either science characteristics that conflict with basic values [1], or messaging
from elites [4], could plausibly explain the origins of science rejection on particular topics. Tesler
(2018), for example, finds that elite rhetoric dominates public rejection of climate change; but it
has little effect with regard to evolution, where resistance comes from more stable beliefs.
Individual cognitive [2] and social [3] processes, on the other hand, could serve as intermediate
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or mediating factors that maintain and intensify science rejection that has become identity-linked.
They also help to explain individual variation. The receive-accept-sample (RAS) framework of
Zaller (1992) effectively integrates these ideas by suggesting that messaging from political elites
drives opinions [4], but individuals differ in their awareness and response to such messages [2].
The most politically-aware individuals, having assimilated messages from their elites, can spread
these among less-aware peers [3].
Although some experimental research finds that such processes can affect both liberals and
conservatives, other studies report asymmetries (Jost 2017). For example, conservatives tend to
have more politically homogeneous networks on online platforms such as Twitter (Boutyline and
Willer 2017), to be more politically selective in choosing their sources of information (Rodriguez
et al. 2017), show greater interest in pseudoscience (Lewandowsky et al. 2020) and ideologically
compatible fake news (Guess et al. 2018), and are more inclined toward conspiratorial thinking
(Cassese et al. 2020; Goldberg and Richey 2020; Jamieson and Albarracin 2020; Lewandowsky
and Cook 2020; Lewandowsky et al. 2016; van der Linden et al. 2020). Studies also find
conservatives paying closer attention to cues about identity-appropriate positions (Bullock 2011;
Carmichael et al. 2017). Such asymmetries help account for the disproportionately conservative
distrust in scientists observed across a range of topics (e.g., Hamilton 2015).
In the first half of 2020, conservative distrust of scientists became a dominant feature of the US
public reaction to COVID-19 (Brzezinski et al. 2020; Cassese et al. 2020; Lewandowsky and
Cook 2020; Safford and Hamilton 2020; multiple polls linked in Saletan 2020). Elite cues were
certainly involved (Allcott et al. 2020; Bisbee and Lee 2020; Gadarian et al. 2020; Green et al.
2020; Grossman et al. 2020, Sides et al. 2020). In a revealing counterpoint, Merkley et al. (2020)
observe that both elite and public polarization were lower in Canada. Apart from elite influences,
however, the new topic also evokes old forces such as anti-intellectualism (Merkley 2020;
Merkley and Loewen 2020; Motta 2017, 2018). Politicized resistance to mitigation steps such as
testing and tracing, restrictions on mobility or gatherings, and mask policies was widely
expressed in terms of conservatives valuing individual freedom. Both mask wearing and non-
wearing were socially stigmatized in different circles (Gorman and Gorman 2020). The
politicized distrust of science relating to COVID-19 essentially “checks all the boxes” of
explanations reviewed above—but was there a primary driver?
In this paper we address that question through analysis of three surveys conducted during early
months of the US pandemic. Each survey carried a question asking people whether they trusted
science agencies such as the CDC for information about the coronavirus. Initial responses display
fairly bipartisan support. This bipartisan initial condition deteriorated quickly, however. Within
just four months, the Democrat–Republican gap widened from 10 to 64 points, following a sharp
reversal of attitudes toward the CDC expressed by President Donald Trump and amplified by
conservative media. Although other value, cognitive and social factors came into play, the
suddenness and narrowness of this change implicates elite cues.
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3. DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Three Surveys
The Survey Center at the University of New Hampshire collected data for this study through
online surveys of people recruited randomly from phone numbers across the state. Past
comparisons between New Hampshire and nationally representative telephone surveys found
similar responses on science and environment-related questions, suggesting that the state can
provide a rough proxy for the US on such topics (e.g., Hamilton 2016; Hamilton et al. 2018).
Parallel comparisons using New Hampshire and national online surveys have not yet been
attempted, although the New Hampshire online and telephone methodologies are well
benchmarked against each other.
Three online surveys with COVID-19 questions were conducted in the first half of 2020 from
March 17 to 26 (n = 650), April 16 to 20 (n = 1,155), and July 16 to 28 (n = 959). Preliminary
reports summarize the pandemic context and results from each survey (Hamilton and Safford
2020b, 2020c; Safford and Hamilton 2020). There is some overlap among respondents in
successive surveys. For example, 650 people responded to the March survey, and 1,155 in April.
Those 1,155 April respondents included 496 who had also responded in March. A small group
(194) responded to all three surveys, although anonymity arrangements prevent our tracking them
as a distinct panel. For the four dependent variables that were asked only on the July survey, the
issue of overlapping respondents does not arise. It might have relevance for analysis of one
question (change behavior, see Table 1) asked on March and April surveys, and another question
(trust CDC) that was asked on all three. Tests described in the Robustness of Findings section
indicate, however, that this issue makes no difference to the conclusions.
Within each survey, weights proportional to the inverse probability of selection were calculated,
adjusting sample profiles toward New Hampshire’s adult population in terms of sex, age,
education and region (based on targets from the most recent American Community Survey
conducted by the US Census Bureau), as well as political party registration (provided by the New
Hampshire Secretary of State). Such weights are applied to all analyses in this paper.
As context for interpreting these 2020 surveys, we also show comparable results from two
surveys conducted in fall 2016, which asked about trusting science agencies such as CDC for
information regarding the Zika virus pandemic. The designs of these earlier surveys, although not
these specific results, have been previously described (Safford et al. 2017, 2020).
3.2 Variable Definitions
Table 1 lists six questions about COVID-19 behavior or perceptions that define our dependent
variables. Along with question wording, the table shows weighted response percentages and the
month (March, April and/or July) in which each question was asked. It also lists codes for
regression analysis. Survey results indicate a predominantly cooperative response to the
pandemic. In the early days, even before the governor’s stay-at-home order in late March, more
than three-fourths already said they were making major changes in their daily routines, such as
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leaving home less often (change behavior). Later, as masks were recommended, 77% reported
that they always wore a mask in public, or always did so unless they were outside and social
distancing (wear mask). Such behavior helps to explain why the state’s COVID-19 infection rates
remained relatively low, by US standards, through this period. Other items in Table 1 likewise
suggest majorities took the pandemic seriously.
Table 1: COVID-19 variable definitions, with months in 2020 when questions were asked, and codes
used for regressions in Table 3.
Change behavior  (March, April) — Have you changed your daily routine in any way specifically because of the
coronavirus?
• No changes in my daily routine (0, 8%)
• Minor changes only, such as washing hands more often (0, 14%)
• Major changes, such as leaving home less often (1, 78%)
• no answer (0, 0.2%)
Wear mask  (July) — What best describes your own current use of a face mask (covering mouth and nose) as a
COVID-19 precaution, when going out in public places such as stores, restaurants, or parks?
• I always use a face mask in public places (1, 29%)
• I always use a face mask when out in public, unless I am outdoors and can maintain social distance (1, 48%)
• I sometimes use a face mask in public places (0, 15%)
• I never use a face mask in public places (0, 7%)
• no answer (0, 2%)
Worry health  (July) — How worried are you that you, or someone in your family, might become sick with
COVID-19 over the next year?
• Very worried (1, 26%)
• Moderately worried (1, 31%)
• Slightly worried (0, 25%)
• Not at all worried (0, 18%)
• no answer (0, 1%)
Priority virus  (July) — Which of the following do you think should be the highest priority of state and federal
governments, with regard to COVID-19?
• The government’s highest priority should be to contain the spread of COVID-19, even if that hurts the
economy (1, 60%)
• The government’s highest priority should be to restart the economy, even if that increases the risk to public
health (0, 30%)
• no answer (0, 10%)
Worst to come  (July) — Which of the following statements do you think is more accurate concerning the
coronavirus or COVID-19 in the United States?
• The worst is yet to come (1, 59%)
• The worst is behind us (0, 21%)
• COVID-19 has not really been a major problem in the US? (0, 6%)
• no answer (0, 14%)
Trust CDC  (March, April, July) — As a source of information about the coronavirus, would you say that you trust,
don’t trust, or are unsure about science agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) that study infectious
diseases?
• Trust (1, 69%)
• Don’t trust (0, 13%)
• Unsure (0, 18%)
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Table 2 lists independent variable definitions and coding. These include respondent age, gender,
education and political party, along with survey month. Table 2 also list two other political-
identity indicators, Fox News watching and Trump support, which may be predictive of COVID
opinions (e.g., Hamilton and Safford 2020c). These two questions were not asked on all surveys,
so are not used in the multivariate analysis of Table 3, but bivariate analysis of July results
(Figure 3) confirms strong negative associations with trusting the CDC.
Table 2: Independent variables and codes, with weighted summary statistics.
Age — Range 18 to 91 years, mean 49 years. Missing values: 2% gave no answer.
Gender — Male (0, 48%), Female (1, 49%). Missing values: a total of 3% identified as transgender, noncomforming
or nonbinary, or gave no answer.
Education — High school or less (–1, 35%), technical school or some college (0, 31%), college graduate (1, 21%),
postgraduate (2, 12%). Missing values: 1% gave no answer.
Party — Democrat (1 if yes, 0 otherwise, 47%), Independent (1 if yes, 0 otherwise, 9%), Republican (1 if yes, 0
otherwise, 42%). Missing values: 2% said other party, or gave no answer.
Month — March 2020 (0, n = 650), April 2020 (1, n = 1,155), July 2020 (4, n = 959)
Fox News (Figure 3 only; not asked on all surveys) — Don’t know or watch never (1, 58%), occasionally (2, 23%),
at least several times per week (3, 19%)
Trump (Figure 3 only; not asked on all surveys) — Disapprove (1, 61%), approve (3, 37%), neither approve nor
disapprove, or don’t know (omitted, 2%)
3.3 Regression Modeling
Codes given for dependent variables in Table 1 simplify each into binary {0,1} form, suitable for
binomial logit regression. The “1” category in each case identifies the most salient and
substantively important response, such as wearing a mask most of the time (29 + 48 = 77%).
Analysis with binomial logit offers parsimony and interpretive advantages over multi-category
methods such as ordered or multinomial logit, but all yield similar conclusions, as summarized in
the Robustness of Findings section.
Independent variable definitions are given in Table 2. Age is measured in years, and gender
represented by a {0,1} dichotomy. About 3% of the respondents chose one of several nonbinary
gender identities (transgender, nonconforming, other) or gave no answer. These nonbinary
identities could be of substantive interest for some research, but their numbers are too small for
meaningful analysis in our surveys. Education is coded with four values from –1 to +2, centered
(for interaction-effect purposes) on technical school or some college (0). Previous studies have
shown monotonic and approximately linear effects of such four-degree education indicators on a
wide range of science- or environment-related dependent variables (Fogg et al. 2020; Hamilton
and Fogg 2019; Safford et al. 2020), including “trust scientists for information” items similar to
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the trust CDC question here (Hamilton 2015; Hamilton et al. 2015a). Political party involves
self-identification as Democrat, Independent or Republican. Two percent selected some other
party or gave no answer. Again, these minor-party and no-party categories are potentially
intriguing, but too sparse for analysis here.
The final independent variable in Table 2 is survey month, coded as 0, 1 or 4 for March, April or
July—representing the calendar sequence 3, 4, 7 but with an interpretable zero point for
interaction purposes. This variable matters for two models that analyze questions asked in two or
three different months. Four other models analyze questions that were only asked in July.
4. RESULTS
Table 1 summarized univariate distributions of responses to six coronavirus questions. One of
these, trust CDC, is most interesting because we can track changes across three surveys in 2020,
and also through comparison with two 2016 surveys that asked a nearly identical question
regarding the Zika virus pandemic. After characterizing temporal changes, and bivariate
associations between trust CDC and respondent characteristics, we apply regression methods to
test a common set of characteristics as predictors for each of the coronavirus items.
4.1 Trust in Science Agencies
During the Zika pandemic in 2016, random-sample US and New Hampshire telephone surveys
(described in Safford et al. 2017, 2020) asked,
As a source of information about the Zika virus, would you say that you trust,
don’t trust, or are unsure about science agencies such as the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) that study infectious diseases?
The US survey (Figure 1a) found that trust in science agencies such as the CDC regarding Zika
was high among both Democrats (83%) and Republicans (72%). The New Hampshire survey
(Figure 1b) found almost identical results among Democrats (82%), but a smaller majority
among Republicans (57%). These 2016 Zika results provide historical benchmarks.
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Figure 1:  Percent who trust science agencies such as CDC for Zika virus information, by political party on
two fall 2016 surveys: (a) US nationwide POLES survey, and (b) New Hampshire GSP survey. See
Safford et al. 2017, 2020 for background on these two surveys.
On our 2020 New Hampshire surveys, we asked a coronavirus version of this question (trust
CDC defined in Table 1). The March 2020 survey found 77% trust overall, higher than either of
the 2016 surveys and indicative of bipartisan support. By July 2020, however, overall trust in
science agencies such as CDC for information about the coronavirus had fallen to just 59%, well
below 2016 levels (Figure 2).
11
Figure 2:  As a source of information about the coronavirus, would you say that you trust, don’t trust, or
are unsure about science agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) that study infectious
diseases? (a) Percent “trust” responses to March, April and July 2020 surveys, and (b) all responses to
the July survey.
Who trusts science agencies for coronavirus information? Figure 3 charts July 2020 “trust”
percentages by respondent characteristics. Gender and age differences are not significant. Trust is
significantly higher among college graduates, and lower among respondents with high school
education or less. The most dramatic differences, however, involve political identity: 89% of
Democrats but only 25% of Republicans said they trust science agencies. Similarly wide gaps are
seen between those who do or do not approve of President Trump, and frequently or never watch
Fox News—two alternative indicators for political identity. Only 19% of those who approve
Trump, and 22% of frequent Fox News viewers, said they trust science agencies such as CDC for
information. (For other indications of conservative media effects on COVID-19 perceptions and
behavior, see Bursztyn et al. 2020; Hamilton and Safford 2020a, 2021; Jamieson and Albarracin
2020; Simonov et al. 2020.)
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Figure 3:  Percent who trust science agencies such as CDC for coronavirus information (July 2020
survey), by respondent characteristics.
The overall decline in trust charted in Figure 2a, together with background differences seen in
Figure 3, raises an obvious question: Who lost trust? Figure 4 supplies a clear answer. At the
time of the March survey, Republican trust in science agencies such as CDC for coronavirus
information was notably higher than that of Independents, and only 10 points lower than
Democrats (74% vs. 84%). Subsequently, however, Republican trust fell off steeply: from 74%
in March to just 25% in July. Expressions of trust by Democrats and Independents, meanwhile,
were slightly higher in July than in March, so the Democrat–Republican gap exploded from 10
points in March to 64 points in July.
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Figure 4:  Percent who trust science agencies such as CDC for coronavirus information, by survey month
and respondent political party.
4.2 Predictors of Behavior and Perceptions
Might the Republican decline in trust charted in Figure 4 be partly spurious, or reflect sampling
variation between surveys? Table 3 tests this possibility, and explores the social basis of
COVID-19 behavior and perceptions more generally, through logit regressions involving the six
dependent variables defined in Table 1. Each COVID-19 variable is regressed on a common set
of predictors—respondent age, gender, education and {0,1} indicators for Independent or
Republican party (Democrat being the reference category). For the change behavior question
asked on two surveys, or trust CDC asked on three, we also test for change by entering survey
month as a predictor.
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Table 3. Predictors of behavior and perceptions related to COVID-19. Odds ratios from weighted logit
regressions; see Table 1 for variable definitions and coding.
Dependent variable
1. Change 2. Wear 3. Worry 4. Priority 5. Worst 6. Trust
Predictor behavior mask health virus to come CDC
Age 1.013 1.058*** 1.018 0.998 1.016 0.995
Gender (F) 2.411** 0.933 1.180 0.839 0.713 0.824
Education 1.170 0.665 1.158 0.654* 0.809 0.930
Party
  Democrat (base) (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
  Independent 0.334* 0.130** 0.883 0.064*** 0.200** 0.205***
  Republican 0.301*** 0.015*** 0.109*** 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.506*
Education×party
   Democrat (base) (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
   Independent 1.003 1.577 0.414* 1.478 0.974 1.619*
   Republican 0.861 2.528* 0.807 2.272* 1.816 1.546*
Month 1.230 .... .... .... .... 1.100
Month×party
   Democrat (base) (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
   Independent .... .... .... .... .... 0.913
   Republican .... .... .... .... .... 0.534***
F statistic 9.53*** 9.70*** 18.51*** 25.09*** 23.91*** 17.58***
Survey months Mar, Apr Jul Jul Jul Jul Mar, Apr, Jul
Estimation sample 1,739 899 899 899 899 2,638
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001  (two-tailed tests)
All models in Table 3 include education×party interaction terms. Education×party effects, or
similar interactions involving other knowledge and political indicators, have been found in
previous studies to affect responses on science trust (Hamilton et al. 2015a; Safford et al. 2020)
and many other science-related topics (Drummond and Fischhoff 2017; Hamilton 2008, 2011;
Hamilton et al. 2012, 2015b; Kahan et al. 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Shao et al. 2014;
Tranter 2019; Zummo et al. 2020). Their usual form is that trust in scientists rises with education
among Democrats and Independents (or liberals and moderates), but stays level or declines with
education among the most conservative. If education×party interactions exist but are left out of
the models, analysts risk underestimating the effects of both education and party. Model 6 for
trust CDC, the only question asked on all three surveys, also includes month×party interaction
terms suggested by Figure 4.
Although older respondents were more likely to report mask wearing (model 2, July), we
otherwise see no significant age effects, contrary to what might be expected from relative health
risks, or the higher social cost of compliance with mobility reductions among young people
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(Merkley and Loewen 2020). Women more often said they made major changes in daily routines
(model 1, March and April), but gender effects are otherwise nonsignificant. Education exhibits
no main effects, but because the models include education×party interactions, that result is
conditional. The (lack of) main effects from education simply means that responses did not
change with education among Democrats, the reference category of party.
The main effects shown for Independent and Republican represent contrasts between those
respondents and Democrats, among people having technical school or some college education
(education = 0) and, for model 6 only (with its month×party interaction), in March (month = 0).
Republicans with technical school/some college education, for example, are less likely than
Democrats to (1) have changed their behavior early in the pandemic, (2) wear a mask, (3) worry
about themselves or their family getting sick, (4) view controlling the virus as a higher priority,
(5) think that for the US, the worst is yet to come, or (6) trust science agencies such as CDC for
information about the virus. Independents gave responses intermediate between Republicans and
Democrats on most of these issues.
4.3 Interaction Effects
Partisan identity has consistently significant main effects in the same direction across all models
in Table 3: Republicans take the pandemic less seriously. Party has further impacts through
education×party interactions and, in model 6, a month×party interaction. (A month×party
interaction could in principle have been included with model 1 also, but its effect with just two
months is not significant, and raises collinearity problems.) Figure 5 plots predicted probabilities
from the education×party and month×party interactions in model 6.
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Figure 5:  Margins plots showing (a) education×party and (b) month×party interaction effects on trust in
science agencies such as CDC, calculated from model 6 in Table 3 (with 95% confidence intervals).
As mentioned earlier, education×party (or similar) interactions have previously been documented
for science trust, climate change, and other science or environment-related topics. In those
instances, however, the interactions could be visualized as a right-opening megaphone, wherein
the gap between Democrats and Republicans, or liberals and conservatives, widens with higher
education. In Figure 5a we see the opposite: the gap narrows with higher education, as college-
educated Republicans and Independents express relatively greater trust in science agencies. The
widest partisan gap occurs among those with high school or less. Similar patterns occur with
education×party effects in models for wear mask, priority virus and worst to come.
The month×party interaction graphed in Figure 5b depicts an extraordinary change over the
course of three surveys. Among Republicans only, there was a steep decline of trust in science
agencies such as the CDC. This regression adjusts for other background factors, but the decline’s
magnitude remains similar to that seen in the unadjusted analysis of Figure 4. In contrast, studies
that have repeated questions about trust in scientists on other topics report considerable stability
(Hamilton 2015; Hamilton et al. 2017).
4.4 Robustness of Findings
Statistical analysis requires many decisions, which arguably could be made different ways. While
trying to make the best decisions in each case, it remains important to explore reasonable
alternatives, evaluating the sensitivity of findings. This section describes a number of alternative
analyses, all of which support the robustness of main conclusions.
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Alternatives to binomial logit: The wording of some survey questions in Table 1 is intrinsically
binary or categorical (priority virus, trust CDC), making binomial logit an obvious choice. Other
questions (wear mask, change behavior, worry health), however, offer three or four responses
that might be viewed as ordinal. For the analysis in Table 3 we chose to dichotomize these,
emphasizing distinctions of practical importance (major lifestyle changes, usually wearing a
mask, worried about health). Alternatively, they could be analyzed in ordinal form using ordered
logit regression, or even ordinary least squares (OLS). We estimated binomial logit, ordered logit
and OLS versions of each model, and found that the same predictors have significant main
effects in each case: gender, Independent and Republican predict change behavior; age,
Independent and Republican predict wear mask; Republican predict worry health. The only
differences occurred with education×party interactions, which are stronger in binomial versions.
Drawbacks of an ordered-logit approach include complexity, more abstract interpretation, and a
proportional-odds assumption (that the relationship between all pairs of successive groups is the
same) which is rejected in each case by post-estimation tests. Linear regression might be more
robust, but here would assume a constant difference between categories—so “no changes” and
“washing hands more often” (for the change behavior variable) are assumed to be as far apart as
“washing hands” and “leaving home less often.” Even if this were true in a regression sense (so
that party and education have constant effects on probabilities) these steps are not comparable in
their health impacts. For substantive reasons, we prefer the dichotomous approach to focus on the
most salient and health-relevant distinctions. A secondary consideration is that with binomial
logit, all models in Table 3 employ the same estimation strategy, and have coefficients in the
same metric (odds ratios) as model 6 which is our main focus.
Independent observations: Independent observations are assumed for the usual standard errors.
This assumption is violated by our panel data, which include some repeat respondents.
Cluster-robust standard errors (based on a Huber/White/sandwich estimator), however, do not
require this assumption, allowing for clustered observations—in this case, panel respondents. We
estimated alternative versions of the two multi-month regressions, models 1 and 6, using
cluster-robust standard errors. Although cluster-robust standard errors are slightly larger, the
same effects and interactions are significant, at similar levels, either way. As a second test, we
estimated a version of model 6 keeping only the unique respondents (estimation sample n =
1,758 instead of 2,638). Again, substantive conclusions are the same, even setting aside one-third
of the data.
Treatment of no-answer responses: If no-answer respondents are discarded from the priority
virus regression, the estimation sample drops from n = 899 to 833. However, the same effects
(education, Independent, Republican, education×Republican) are significant, with comparable
magnitude, either way. If no-answer respondents are discarded from the worst to come regression
(model 5 in Table 3), the estimation sample drops from n = 899 to 805. Again, the same effects
(Independent, Republican) are significant, with comparable magnitude, either way. From these
indications, the no-answer responses do not appear problematic. We chose not to discard
observations from the Table 3 analyses because (1) results apply to the representative sample,
rather than a restricted sample of people who gave definite answers; and (2) interpretation is
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straightforward, contrasting people who think containing the virus should be the highest priority,
or that worst was yet to come, with people who do not hold those views.
Other respondent characteristics: The July survey asked about employment status and income,
so it is possible to estimate versions of models 2–5 (but not 1 or 6) including these as predictors.
Income shows a significant effect only in model 3 (worry health): respondents from
higher-income households worry less about their health. Employment status has significant
effects only in models 3 (worry health)  and 5 (worst to come): in both, retired people express
lower worry than those employed full time. Retirement effects are hard to interpret, however,
being confounded with age. No other employment statuses make a significant difference.
Substantive conclusions about political identity are not changed in any of these models, but we
lose about 10% of the sample (due to missing values of income), and also give up comparability
with models 1 and 6. For these reasons we kept the simpler, comparable versions of models 2–5
in Table 3.
Three-way interaction: Model 6 in Table 3 includes two 2-way interactions, education×party and
month×party, both of which prove to be significant. We tested for a 3-way
month×education×party interaction, but that was not significant and brought no improvement in
fit.
5. DISCUSSION
Replications are needed to assess the generality of these New Hampshire findings, but the “social
bases of COVID concern” seen in our data are broadly consistent with those found in many other
studies cited above—including evidence of rapid polarization (Sides et al. 2020). An overall
decline of public trust in science agencies such as the CDC also appears in a nationwide CBS
poll (De Pinto 2020).
We noted that four kinds of explanations have been applied to explain politicized distrust of
scientists: characteristics of the science itself, cognitive factors, peer or cultural influences, and
cues from elites. The relative importance of different processes in creating and reinforcing public
attitudes no doubt varies from case to case, but the drop we observe in trust of science agencies
such as the CDC for information about the coronavirus was strikingly large (almost 50 points),
narrow (Republicans only), and rapid (four months), even while public communication from the
CDC was comparatively muted. These observations implicate elite cues as the probable
explanation.
Over the four months spanned by our surveys, President Trump’s pronouncements about the
CDC, amplified by conservative media, transformed from exuberant praise into wariness and
then active hostility. In the early days of the pandemic he tweeted praise:
“The Coronavirus is very much under control in the USA. We are in contact with
everyone and all relevant countries. CDC & World Health have been working
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hard and very smart. Stock Market starting to look very good to me!” (February
24)
On February 26 he tweeted that CDC was “doing a great job,” and the next day thanked “all of
the many professionals doing such a fine job at CDC & all other agencies on the Coronavirus
situation.” These expressions set the stage for the high Republican trust in CDC seen on our
March survey, which was not far below that of Democrats, and higher than Republican trust in
CDC during the Zika virus pandemic.
As March progressed, however, Trump began to criticize the CDC for failures he said originated
under President Obama. A “Trump-Fox feedback loop” of misinformation on COVID-19, in
which Trump and Fox News each amplified the other (Stelter 2020), widened the reach of this
criticism. A modest Republican decline in CDC trust appears on our survey in April.
On April 21 (just after the April survey) CDC Director Robert Redfield warned that a second
wave of the coronavirus, coming in winter, could be even more difficult than the first. This
warning proved accurate, but it contradicted Trump’s public assurances that the disease would
soon disappear. Trump reacted with a tweet denying that the Redfield interview was authentic:
“CDC Director was totally misquoted by Fake News @CNN  on Covid 19. He
will be putting out a statement.” (April 22)
Shortly before the July survey, Trump tweeted that CDC was wrong to advise caution, and
should have their minds changed:
“I disagree with @CDCgov on their very tough & expensive guidelines for
opening schools. While they want them open, they are asking schools to do very
impractical things. I will be meeting with them!!!” (July 8)
That same day he retweeted to his 80 million followers a quote from TV game show host Chuck
Woolery accusing the CDC of lying. Conservative media repeated this accusation. By our July
survey, Republican trust in CDC scientists had fallen by almost 50 points. Meanwhile, trust
among Democrats and Independents changed little. Looking back over five surveys and two
pandemics, CDC trust among Democrats or Independents had been remarkably stable—varying
by just 7 points among Democrats, or 11 points among the smaller subsamples of Independents.
Trump’s public disparagement of the organization subsequently intensified. His attacks on
scientists led to unprecedented editorials condemning the president in Science, Nature, Scientific
American and the New England Journal of Medicine (Thorpe 2020; Nature 2020; Scientific
American 2020; NEJM 2020). Analysis by Evanega et al. (2020) found the US president to have
been internationally the largest driver of COVID-19 misinformation.
Distrust of scientists regarding climate change and environmental protection took root less
suddenly than with COVID-19, but these too are comparatively modern phenomena. Jacques et
al. (2012) document the elite-driven counter-movement weakening US public support for
environmental protections, in large part by attacking the credibility of environmental scientists.
Multiple studies (Brulle et al. 2012; Carmichael et al. 2017; Dunlap and McCright 2015; Merkley
and Stecula 2018) examine the role of elite cues in raising public doubts about scientists on
20
climate change. Our COVID-19 conclusions fit with these previous studies, but show a much
faster timeline.
Research on environmental protection and climate change often reports education×party
interactions in which divisions widen with education, interpreted to indicate that better educated
partisans are more attuned to elite cues—consistent with Zaller’s (1992) point that elite discourse
reaches more politically-aware individuals. The education×party interaction seen in Figure 5a,
however, goes in the opposite direction: better educated individuals exhibit less polarization. If
replicated, this hints at different information dynamics around COVID-19. Although we see no
education gradient related to Fox News viewership in the July survey, there is one for
conservative talk radio listeners, who tend to be less educated and hold more extreme views on
the pandemic (Hamilton and Safford 2020c, 2021). Some online media not explored here might
have similar profiles. College-educated conservatives, conversely, are more likely than less
educated conservatives to consume mainstream media such as newspapers and public radio,
potentially exposing them to more diverse views.
As for the CDC itself, the organization was created to deal with just such a crisis, but its response
to COVID-19 has been criticized by experts. Although the agency started planning for tests to
detect the new virus in January, soon after reports began emerging from China, the first test kits
it produced did not work. Replacements were delayed and too few in number so that US
diagnostic and tracking efforts fell far behind those of other countries, and behind the spread of
the virus itself (Washington Post 2020). Under Trump-appointed director Robert Redfield the
CDC kept a low profile. Its scientists were rebuked or prevented from speaking out, and even
Redfield was contradicted by the president (Lipton et al. 2020). At a time when strong scientific
advice was urgently needed, the advice coming from CDC often seemed weak, contradictory, and
out of step with the conclusions of independent scientists. Political operatives overruled
scientists’ advice, leading to an extraordinary op-ed by two leading public health experts: “It has
come to this: Ignore the CDC” (Varmus and Shah 2020; for CDC insiders’ accounts see Weiland
2020). With a vaccination campaign coming soon, CDC missteps and political interference cost
the agency credibility it urgently needed (Sun and Achenbach 2020). Thus, there are good
reasons to expect trust in the CDC might decline among Democrats as well, but that was not
evident over the months of these surveys.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Three New Hampshire surveys conducted in March, April and July 2020 tracked a dramatic
decline of trust in science agencies such as the CDC for information about the coronavirus. This
decline occurred only among Republicans, who dropped from 74% trust (not far below that of
Democrats) in March, to 62% in April and 25% in July. These changes follow a reversal of views
on the CDC expressed by President Trump, and amplified by conservative media. The pattern
suggests elite cues in action: top-down messages creating deep public divisions regarding science
that, at the start of this period, enjoyed relatively bipartisan approval in keeping with Trump’s
initially positive cues. Similar elite-driven processes have been noted by other researchers
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regarding environmental protection and climate change, but the COVID-19 case is extreme.
Other questions on the surveys likewise reflect politicized views of the science: Republicans
were less likely to wear a mask, worry about themselves or family getting sick, consider
controlling the virus as a higher priority than restarting the economy, or to believe scientists’
warnings (unfortunately since confirmed) that without such measures, the worst of the pandemic
was yet to come.
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